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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS***
The following amicus curiae brief was written pursuant to the
Scheduling Order of the President of the Special Tribunal for Leba-
non (STL) of 21 January 2011 regarding case STL-11-01/I. On this
same date the Pre-Trial Judge of the STL posed several questions to
the Appeals Chamber (Chamber)1 pursuant to Rule 68(G) of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.2 Three of these questions dealt
* Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law and Inter-
national Criminal Law at the Georg-August Universita¨t Go¨ttingen; Judge at the
District Court (Landgericht) Go¨ttingen. [kambos@gwdg.de]. I am grateful to stud.
iur. T. Anina Timmermann (Go¨ttingen) for her most valuable assistance.
** The Brief (i.e. excluding the authors’ introductory remarks) is published as
submitted to the Special Tribunal to Lebanon.
*** These introductory remarks were drafted speciﬁcally for inclusion in this vol-
ume of Criminal Law Forum and did not form part of the original brief.
1 STL, Le Juge de la Mise en E´tat, Ordonnance relative aux questions pre´judicielles
adresse´es aux juges de la Chambre d’Appel conforme´ment a` l’article 68, paragraphe g)
du Re`glement de Proce´dure et de Preuve, 21 Janvier 2011 (STL-11-01/I).
2 Rule 68 (G) is quite unique in international criminal procedure in that it gives
the Pre-Trial Judge the possibility to clarify fundamental questions by way of an
interlocutory procedure involving the Appeals Chamber (The Pre-Trial Judge may
submit to the Appeals Chamber any preliminary question, on the interpretation of
the Agreement, Statute and Rules regarding the applicable law, that he deems nec-
essary in order to examine and rule on the indictment’.)
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with the crime of terrorism3: (1) Should the Tribunal take into
account international notions on terrorism even though Article 2 of
the Statute only refers to the Lebanese Criminal Code (LCC)?; (2) If
so, is there an international deﬁnition of terrorism and how should it
be applied?; and (3) If not, how is the Lebanese deﬁnition of terrorism
to be interpreted by the Chamber? Both the prosecution and the
defence submitted extensive briefs dealing, inter alia, with these
questions.4 Additionally, two amicus curiae briefs were submitted,
among them this one, which focused on the subjective side of the
crime of terrorism.5
On February 16, 2011, the Chamber issued its (interlocutory)
decision pursuant to Rule 176bis (A).6 The Chamber argues, in a
nutshell, that terrorism has become a crime under international law
and that the respective international deﬁnition inﬂuences the (appli-
cable) Lebanese law. It refers to the Brief published here essentially to
support its proposal of the subjective side of an international crime of
terrorism.7 The Brief itself does not, however, support the conclusion
3 The fourth question referring to terrorism (If the perpetrator intended to kill a
certain person but caused injury or death to other persons, how is his criminal
responsibility to be deﬁned?’) is irrelevant for our purpose since it deals with the
general issue of the subjective attribution of unintended consequences.
4 Defence Oﬃce’s submission pursuant to rule 176bis (31 Jan. 2011), available at
www.stl-tsl.org/x/ﬁle/TheRegistry/Library/CaseFiles/Defence/20110131_STL-11-
01_R176bis_F0004_DO_Submissions_R176bis.pdf (visited on 31 March 2011),
paras. 8–125 (hereinafter Defence Brief’); Prosecutor’s Brief ﬁled pursuant to the
president’s order of 21 January 2011. Responding to the questions submitted by
the Pre-Trial judge (Rule 176bis) (31 Jan. 2011) www.stl-tsl.org/x/ﬁle/The
Registry/Library/CaseFiles/Prosecution/20110131_STL-11-01_R176bis_F0003_
OTP_Brief_EN.pdf (visited on 31 March 2011), paras. 6–31 (Prosecution
Brief’).
5 The Brief was registered under STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis (11 February 2011)
and published on www.stl-tsl.org/x/ﬁle/TheRegistry/Library/CaseFiles/Registry/
20110211_STL-11-01_R176bis_F0009_Amicus_Curiae_Ambos_Filed_EN.pdf. The
other Brief, still submitted in time (the very sharp deadline was set on 11 February
2011, i.e., 4 days after the Appeals Chamber hearing), was by the War Crimes Re-
search Oﬃce of American University, The Practice of Cumulative Charging Before
International Criminal Bodies, STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis (11 Feb. 2011) (visited on
31 March 2011), also published in this issue of Criminal Law Forum.
6 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homi-
cide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/I/AC/R176bis, Feb. 16, 2011
(Decision’).
7 Decision (n. 6 above), para. 57 with fn. 79, para. 83 with fn. 127, para. 84, para.
93 with fn. 162 et seq., para. 95 with fn. 176.
KAI AMBOS390
of the Chamber; in fact, it did not deal with the question whether
there exists an international crime of terrorism at all. I have dealt
with this question afterwards, critically examining the terrorism
part of the Appeals Chamber decision.8 I have there basically argued
that the Chamber’s considerations, albeit innovative and creative,
are essentially obiter since the applicable terrorism deﬁnition can be
found, without further ado, in the Lebanese law. There is no need to
internationalize or re-interpret this law, it should be applied before
the STL as understood in Lebanese practice. As to the Chamber’s
aﬃrmation that there is a crime of terrorism under international
law, I argued that the available sources indicate, at best, that ter-
rorism is a particularly serious transnational, treaty-based crime
which comes close to a true’ international crime but has not yet
reached this status. Notwithstanding that the general elements of this
crime can be inferred from the relevant sources of international law.
8 K. Ambos, Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a
Crime of Terrorism Under International Law?’ (2011) 24 (3) Leiden Journal of
International Law 655. For an even more critical view on the decision see B. Saul,
Legislating from a radical The Hague: the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon
invents an international crime of transnational terrorism’, (2011) 24 (3) LJIL 677;
S. Kirsch/A. Oehmichen, Judges gone astray: The fabrication of terrorism as an
international crime by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, (2011) 1Durham L.Rev. 32.
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TEXT OF THE BRIEF
I. ART. 314 LEBANESE CRIMINAL CODE (LCC) AS THE
APPLICABLE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME
OF TERRORISM
1. Art. 314 LCC is applicable before the Tribunal by way of the
renvoi in Art. 2(a) of the Tribunal’s Statute. Not only the text of
the Statute but also the travaux clearly indicate that the national
Lebanese law should be the only body of law relevant before the
Tribunal as to the deﬁnition of the relevant oﬀences.1
2. Art. 314 LCC provides for a rather broad oﬀence deﬁnition
requiring, on theobjective level (actus reus), ‘‘acts […] liable to create
a public danger such as explosive devices’’ etc. and, on the subjective
level (mens rea), a general intent with regard to these objective acts
and a – here so called – ‘‘general’’ (normal) special intent (‘‘intended
to cause a state of terror’’). Art. 314 does not contain further deﬁ-
nitional elements, in particular it does not contain a –here so called –
‘‘special’’ special intent, i.e., a special intent which, going beyond the
‘‘general’’ special intent of causing terror, requires a particular
political or ideological purpose, e.g., ‘‘the purpose of coercing a
state, or international organization to do or refrain from doing
something’’.2Art. 314does not require a specialmotive aspart of the
oﬀence deﬁnition either, e.g., that theperpetratormust bemotivated
by ‘‘ideological or political aspirations’’.3
3. While the maxim nullum crimen sine lege (substantive legality), as
understood in Lebanese law as a civil law jurisdiction, does, in
principle, not allow for the ‘‘internationalisation’’ of domestic
criminal law oﬀences4 and while Art. 314, providing for a con-
cluding oﬀence deﬁnition, is, in principle, not in need of inter-
pretative assistance by international law,5 the said maxim does
not stand in the way of an interpretation in bonam partem, i.e., an
1 DefenceOﬃce’s submission pursuant to rule 176 bis (31 Jan. 2011), para. 31, 51, 58.
2 A. Cassese, The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International
Law’ (2006) 4 JICJ, 933, 957.
3 Ibid.
4 Defence submission, supra note 1, para. 60 et seq. (71).
5 Defence submission, supra note 1, paras. 86–89, 112, 125; Prosecutor’s Brief ﬁled
pursuant to the president’s order of 21 January 2011 Responding to the questions
submitted by the pre-trial judge (Rule 176 bis) (31 Jan. 2011), para. 15.
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interpretation which would restrict the oﬀence deﬁnition in fa-
vour of the accused.6 Indeed, the Lebanese criminal law itself
recognizes the retroactivity bonam partem, in the sense of the
French ‘‘retroactivite´ in mitius’’,7 explicitly.8 Thus, an amend-
ment of a national criminal law provision in bonam partem
would, in principle, be admissible,9 also if brought about by
international law.10 The gist of the issue therefore is whether
6 The bonam partem exception is generally recognized in civil law jurisdictions, see, as
representative works, for France F. Debove, F. Falletti, & T. Janville, Pre´cis de droit
pe´nal et de proce´dure pe´nale, 3rd ed. (Paris: Presses Univ. de France, 2010), pp. 74–75;
for Germany C. Roxin, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, vol. I, 4th ed. (Mu¨nchen: Beck,
2006), Section 5 marginal number (mn.) 44 (analogy in bonam partem), 50 (custom in
bonam partem), 62 et seq. (retroactivity in bonam partem); for Spain S. Mir Puig,Derecho
Penal. Parte General (Barcelona: Editorial Reppertor, 2010), p. 116; J.P. Montiel, An-
alogı´a favorable al reo: fundamentos y lı´mites de la analogı´a in bonam partem en el derecho
penal (Madrid: La Ley, 2009), 321 et seq. (on the recognition of supra-legal causes of
justiﬁcation on the basis of an analogy bonam partem which is based on customary law
or general principles). The exception is also recognized in the relevant codiﬁcations, see
for example Art. 112-1 French Penal Code (‘‘retroactivite´ in mitius’’), Section 2 (3)
German Penal Code and Art. 2 (2) Spanish Penal Code. In Italy, the majority doctrine
admits the analogy bonam partem on the basis of Art. 25 (2) of the Constitution and Art.
14 of the preliminary disposition of the Codice Civile which refers to criminal law, see F.
Palazzo, Corso di diritto penale. Parte generale, 2nd ed. (Torino: Giappichelli Editore,
2006), at 142 et seq. with further references on the rich scholarly debate.
7 See supra note 6.
8 Article 3 Lebanese Criminal Code: ‘‘Any statute that amends the deﬁnition of an
oﬀence in a manner that beneﬁts the accused shall be applicable to the acts committed
prior to its entry into force, unless an irrevocable judgement has been rendered’’
(emphasis added). On the Lebanese Law see also Defence submission, supra note 1,
para. 74: ‘‘[…] reliance upon customary law for the purpose of interpreting the
requirements (e.g., a lowering of the applicable mens rea) […].’’
9 See also Defence submission, supra note 1, para. 74.
10 The argument is based on the assumption that Lebanese Criminal law is derived
from and still quite close to French criminal law (see also Defence submission, supra
note 1, para. 73). While French law does not provide for a particular rule or procedure
to ‘‘import’’ customary international law into the domestic legal order, the Consti-
tutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) examines the compatibility of national law
with customary international law and thus recognizes the (de facto) precedence of the
latter (cf. Conseil Constitutionnel, De´cisions no. 75–59 DC of 30 Dec. 1975; no. 82–
139 DC of 11 Feb. 1982; no. 85–197 DC of 23 Aug. 1985; no. 92–308 DC of 09 April
1992; summarizing http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
root/bank/pdf/conseil-constitutionnel-17499.pdf, No. 9). Thus, it can safely be
argued that also the Lebanese legal order, absent any opposing constitutional or other
provision, would accept this precedence and therefore also admit a bonam partem
amendment of its criminal law brought about by international (customary) law.
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international law calls for such a bonam partem interpretation with
respect to the two additional subjective elementsmentioned above.
II PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION: MOTIVES
IN CRIMINAL LAW
4. As a general rule, intent and motive must be distinguished in crim-
inal law. The principle of culpability requires that the perpetrator
acts with a certain state of mind, normally with intent; her possi-
ble motive(s), i.e., the reason(s) why she performed the act is
(are) irrelevant in this respect.11 This – here so called
– irrelevance thesishasbeencorrectly recognizedby the international
case law.12Thus, inprinciple, a certainmotiveonlybecomes relevant
at the sentencing stage as a mitigating or aggravating factor.13
5. The irrelevance thesis requires two qualiﬁers, though. First, the
legislator may include certain motives in the oﬀence deﬁnition
and make them part of the mens rea element, in particular of a
special intent.14 Thus, for example, according to the EU
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism the perpetrator
11 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1978), p. 452; A.
Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), p. 168.
12 Prosecutor v. Tadic,Appeals Judgement (CaseNo. IT-94-1-A), 15 July 1999, paras.
270, 272 (‘‘[…]under customary law, purely personal motives’ do not acquire any rele-
vance […]’’); Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Appeals Chamber Judgement (No. IT-03-66-A),
27 Sept. 2007, para. 109 (‘‘motive is generally not an element of criminal liability’’);
Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Appeals Chamber Judgement (No. IT-95-10-A), 5 July 2001, para.
49 (‘‘[…] existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also
having the speciﬁc intent […]’’), para. 71 (‘‘[…] the irrelevance and inscrutability of
motives in criminal law’ insofar as liability is concerned, where an intent – including a
speciﬁc intent – is clear.’’); Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka, Appeals Chamber Judgement
(No. IT-98-30-1-A), 28 Feb. 2005, para. 106 (‘‘[…] it has repeatedly conﬁrmed the dis-
tinction between intent and motive […]’’). See also: G. Mettraux, International Crimes
and the Ad-hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 211; A. Zahar/G.
Sluiter, InternationalCriminalLaw (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2008), p. 180; J.M.
Go´mez-Benı´tez,ElExterminio deGrupos Polı´ticos en el Derecho Penal Internacional etc.,
Revista de Derecho y Proceso Penal No. 4 2000, p. 147, 151; K. Ambos & S.Wirth, The
Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity. An Analysis of UNTAET Regulation
15/2000’, (2002) 13 Criminal Law Forum, p. 45.
13 Cf. Tadic´ Appeals Judgement, supra note 12, para. 269 (‘‘motive becomes rel-
evant at the sentencing stage in mitigation or aggravation of the sentence’’).
14 See K. Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Vo¨lkerstrafrechts (Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot, 2002), pp. 413–414.
KAI AMBOS394
must act with the aim to intimidate a population, or compel a
Government to perform or abstain from performing any act, or
destabilise the structures of a country.15 Secondly, there is a
classical scholarly discussion whether certain motives or convic-
tions of an ‘‘de´linquant par conviction’’ (,,Gewissensta¨ter‘‘) may
exclude her criminal responsibility (by way of a cause of justiﬁ-
cation or excuse).16 Yet, while this would make motives relevant
at the level of attribution, it does not aﬀect the constituent ele-
ments of the oﬀence (the actus reus, e´le´ment mate´riel,17 tipo,
Tatbestand), i.e., the ‘‘de´linquant par conviction’’ fulﬁlls the
elements of the actus reus, she acts, by all means, ‘‘tipicamente’’
(,,tatbestandsma¨ßig‘‘).
15 Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002 (2002/
475/JHA), Art. 1: ‘‘[…] where committed with the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a
population, or (ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation
to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) seriously destabilising or
destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of
a country or an international organisation.’’
16 See most recently C. Roxin, Noch einmal: Zur strafrechtlichen Behandlung der
Gewissenstat, GA 158 (2011), p. 1 et seq., who argues that the conviction of a
perpetrator can never justify the commission of a criminal oﬀence (at 5) but the act
may be excused if only insigniﬁcant harm was caused (at 15); H.J. Hirsch, Strafrecht
und U¨berzeugungsta¨ter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter) (Schriftenreihe der Juristischen
Gesellschaft zu Berlin, vol. 147) 1996, arguing that a perpetrator may be justiﬁed if
she acts because of a serious moral conﬂict (at 20–21) while a political motivation can
only be taken into account as a mitigating factor (at 27–28); generally for a justiﬁ-
cation: K. Peters, U¨berzeugungsta¨ter und Gewissensta¨ter’, in G. Friedrich &
W. Naucke (eds.), Festschrift fu¨r H. Mayer (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966), p.
257 et seq., at 276; for an excuse: U. Bopp, Der Gewissensta¨ter und das Grundrecht der
Gewissensfreiheit (Karlsruhe: C.F. Mu¨ller, 1974), p. 249 et seq.; against an exclusion
of responsibility J. Baucells I Llado´s, La delincuenia por conviccio´n (Valencia: Tirant
Lo Blanch, 2000), p. 387.
17 The French doctrine on the structure of the crime (the´orie de l’infraction pe´nale)
has traditionally been governed by an elements theory distinguishing between e´le´-
ment le´gal, mate´riel, injuste and moral/psychologique/intellectuelle (see K. Ambos,
Re´ﬂexions sur la the´orie franc¸aise de l’infraction pe´nale du point de vue allemand’,
in J. Leblois-Happe (ed.), Vers un nouveau proce`s pe´nal? (Paris: Socie´te´ de Le´gislation
compare´e, 2008), 147 et seq.; in German: Zur Entwicklung der franzo¨sischen Straf-
tatlehre – Bemerkungen aus deutscher Sicht, ZStW 120 (2008), 180 et seq. (with
further references). Accordingly, the e´le´ment mate´riel can be compared to the actus
reus (see ibid., 154 or 187) although other authors would rather compare the
objective oﬀence deﬁnition with the e´le´ment le´gal (see ibid., 152 et seq. or 185 et seq.).
Modern authors opt for a new terminology more similar to the German Tatbestand
or the Italien and Spanish tipo, see e.g. X. Pin, Droit pe´nal ge´ne´ral, 3rd ed. (Paris:
Dalloz, 2009), at 117 et seq. (fait typique).
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III DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDE FOR A
‘‘SPECIAL’’ SPECIAL INTENT AS AN (ADDITIONAL)
ELEMENT OF THE TERRORISM OFFENCE?
6. Of the relevant primary sources of international law – (i) inter-
national conventions, (ii) international custom and (iii) general
principles of law (Art. 38 ICJ Statute) – only the ﬁrst and third
one contain explicit and unambiguous information as to the
subjective side of the terrorist oﬀence. Yet, on the basis of this
information it may be possible to establish an (emerging) norm of
customary international law.
3.1 Treaty Law, Including Drafts
3.1.1 Universal Conventions
7. Thus far it has not been possible to agree on a universal deﬁnition
of terrorism.18 Notwithstanding, 13 international conventions19
and several UNSecurity Council resolutions20 dealingwith certain
18 Cf. R. Arnold, The ICC as a New Instrument for Repressing Terrorism (Ardsley,
NY: Transnational Publ., 2004), p. 3.
19 Convention on Oﬀences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
(hereinafter quoted as Aircraft Convention’), 1963; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Unlawful Seizure Convention’), 1970; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Civil Aviation Con-
vention’), 1971; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons (Diplomatic Agents Convention’), 1973; International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages; 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material (Hostages Convention’), 1979; Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention’), 1980; Protocol for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
supplementary to theConvention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation (Airport Protocol’), 1988; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Maritime Convention’), 1988; Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol’), 1988; Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic Explosives Convention’), 1991;
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing
Convention’), 1997; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention’), 1999; International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention’), 2005. All
conventions can be found at: www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml.
20 S/RES/635 (1989); S/RES/687 (1991); S/RES/748 (1992); S/RES/731 (1992);
S/RES/1044 (1996); S/RES/1054 (1996); S/RES/1189 (1998); S/RES/1214 (1998);
S/RES/1267 (1999); S/RES/1333 (2000); S/RES/1363 (2001); S/RES/1368 (2001);
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aspects of terrorism exist. Yet, these instruments are not consistent
as to the subjective requirements of the oﬀence deﬁnition. Some
conventions do not contain any subjective element but only pro-
vide for the objective elements of the oﬀence, e.g. seizing control of
an aircraft.21 Other conventions are limited to a general intent
requirement,22 i.e., they only require that the perpetrator acts with
knowledge (cognitive element) and intent (volitive element) with
regard to the objective elements of the oﬀence. Thus, for example,
the Civil Aviation Convention provides in its Art. 1 that ‘‘any
person commits an oﬀence if he […] intentionally […]’’ performs
any one of the following acts.
8. Several conventions contain a double (‘‘general’’ and ‘‘special’’) spe-
cial intent, i.e., they require, on theonehand, a ‘‘general’’ special intent
targeted either at ‘‘causing death or serious bodily injury or extensive
destruction of a place, facility or system’’ or at ‘‘provoking a state of
terror’’ and, on the other hand, a ‘‘special’’ special intent aimed at
coercing a government or international organisation to do or abstain
from performing any act.23 Thus, the question arises whether these
diﬀerent (‘‘general’’ and ‘‘special’’) special intents must be fulﬁlled
cumulatively24 or alternatively.25 The wording speaks for the latter
view since the intents are always linked by the conjunction ‘‘or’’.
9. There are only two conventions which exclusively provide for a
‘‘special’’ special intent by requiring the purpose to compel a
Footnote 20 continued
S/RES/1373 (2001); S/RES/1377 (2001); S/RES/1438 (2002); S/RES/1440 (2002); S/
RES/1450 (2002); S/RES/1452 (2002); S/RES/1456 (2003); S/RES/1465 (2003);
S/RES/1516 (2003); S/RES/1526 (2004); S/RES/1530 (2004); S/RES/1535 (2004); S/
RES/1540 (2004); S/RES/1566 (2004); S/RES/1611 (2005); S/RES/1617 (2005);
S/RES/1618 (2005); S/RES/1624 (2005); S/RES/1625 (2005); S/RES/1631 (2005); S/
RES/1673 (2006); S/RES/1699 (2006); S/RES/1730 (2006); S/RES/1732 (2006);
S/RES/1735 (2006); S/RES/1787 (2007); S/RES/1805 (2008); S/RES/1810 (2008); S/
RES/1822 (2008); S/RES/1904 (2009); S/RES/1963 (2010).
21 Aircraft convention, Art. 2 (1); Unlawful seizure convention, Art. 1; Conven-
tion on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Art. 2.
22 Civil Aviation convention, Art. 1; Diplomatic Agents Convention, Art. 2;
Maritime Convention, Art. 3 (1); Fixed Platform Protocol, Art. 2 (1).
23 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art. 2 (1)(b); Nuclear Terrorism Convention,
Art. 2 (2)(b). A similar wording is also employed in Art. 2 (1) of the Draft Com-
prehensive Convention on International Terrorism, UN SC Resolution 1566, S/Res/
1566, 8. Oct. 2004, para. 3.
24 As suggested in the Pre-Trial Judge’s order of 21 Jan. 2011, paras. 7 (c) and (e).
25 As suggested in the OTP submission, supra note 5, para. 20.
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state or an organisation to perform or abstain from doing any
act.26 Yet, these two conventions only criminalize very speciﬁc
acts of terrorism (taking of hostages and abusing nuclear mate-
rials). In addition, the Nuclear Materials Convention only
requires this ‘‘special’’ special intent for the actus reus alternative
of threatening to abuse nuclear materials whereas the actus reus
alternative of actually committing the oﬀence, i.e., actually
abusing nuclear materials, only requires a general intent.
3.1.2 Regional Instruments
10. In Europe there are two documents of relevance to our question.
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
only refers to most of the above mentioned international con-
ventions27 and does not add any further subjective require-
ments.28 The Framework Decision29 on Combating Terrorism
proposes a terrorism deﬁnition with three special intents,
namely a ‘‘general’’ special intent aimed at causing a state of
terror, a ‘‘special’’ special intent targeted at coercing the state to
do or abstain from performing any act and, last but not least, a
‘‘special’’ special intent directed at destabilizing or destroying
the structure of a country.30 The diﬀerent intents are connected
26 Hostages convention, 1979, Art. 1 (1); Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, 1980, Art. 7 (1)(e)(ii).
27 Namely to the Unlawful Seizure Convention, Civil Aviation Convention,
Diplomatic Agents Convention, Hostages Convention, Nuclear Materials Conven-
tion, Airport Protocol, Maritime Convention, Fixed Platform Protocol, Terrorist
Bombing Convention, Terrorist Financing Convention.
28 Council of Europe, European Convention on the suppression of terrorism,
1977, Art. 1; amended by Protocol amending the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, 2003, Art. 1.
29 Under the old third pillar (police and judicial cooperation) the EU could ‘‘adopt
framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of
the Member States. Framework decisions shall be binding upon the Member States
as to the result to be achieved […]’’ (Art. 34 (2)(b) TEU former version). Framework
decisions remain valid under the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 10 Protocol no. 36 relating to
the Lisbon Treaty, Oﬃcial Journal of the EU, C 115/201 of 9 May 2008).
30 Council Framework Decision, supra note 15; with identical wording Council
Common Position on the Application of Speciﬁc Measures to Combat Terrorism, 27
Dec. 2001 (2001/931/CFSP), para. 3.
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by the conjunction ‘‘or’’ and therefore only need to exist in the
alternative.
11. In the Americas the comprehensive Inter-American Convention
Against Terrorism also refers to most of the above mentioned
international conventions31 and does not contain any additional
subjective requirements.32 In the same vein, the Convention
Against Speciﬁc Terrorist Acts Against Persons does not
provide for any form of special intent.33
12. With regard to Africa the Organization of African Unity’s
(OAU) comprehensive Terrorism Convention contains three
special intents, two of a more ‘‘general’’ nature34 and one of a
‘‘special’’ nature.35 With these tree forms of special intent it is
similar to the EU framework decision mentioned above.36
13. In Asia there are two relevant supranational conventions. The
Convention on Counter Terrorism by the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is only referring to all the above
mentioned international conventions37 and does not add a
further subjective requirement.38 The Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States’ Terrorism Treaty includes both a ‘‘general’’
special intent directed at terrorizing the population or
31 Namely the Unlawful Seizure Convention, Civil Aviation Convention, Diplo-
matic Agents Convention, Hostages Convention, Nuclear Materials Convention,
Airport Protocol, Maritime Convention, Fixed Platform Protocol, Terrorist
Bombing Convention, Terrorist Financing Convention.
32 OAS Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, 2002, Art. 1: ‘‘For the
purposes of this Convention, oﬀenses’ means the oﬀenses established in the inter-
national instruments listed below: […].’’
33 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Signiﬁ-
cance, 1971, Art. 2.
34 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999, Art. I
(3) (a)(ii) and (iii): ‘‘[…] calculated or intended to: […] (ii) disrupt any public service,
the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
(iii) create general insurrection in a State.’’
35 Ibid., Art. I (3) (a)(i): ‘‘[…] calculated or intended to: (i) intimidate, put in fear,
force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any
segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a
particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or […].’’
36 Supra note 30.
37 Supra note 19.
38 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, 2007, Art. 2 (1): ‘‘For the purposes
of this Convention, ‘‘oﬀence’’ means any of the oﬀences within the scope of and as
deﬁned in any of the treaties listed as follows: […].’’
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undermining public safety and a ‘‘special’’ special intent aimed
at inﬂuencing decision-making by the authorities.39
14. The position of the Arab states is contained in three relevant
documents. The comprehensive Arab Terrorism Convention
abandons the requirement of any additional subjective element
explicitly.40 The Organisation of the Islamic Conference only
requires a ‘‘general’’ special intent directed at terrorizing or
harming the people or endangering the environment.41 The
same applies to the Convention of the Cooperation Council for
the Arab States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism.42
3.2 General Principles43
15. A quick look at some national legislations shows that a ‘‘spe-
cial’’ special intent is usually required in the alternative to a
‘‘general’’ special intent. Yet, there is a trend in certain countries
towards a further ‘‘special’’ special intent requiring a political,
religious or ideological purpose.
16. With regard to major Common Law countries there appears
to be a tendency towards the additional requirement of a
political purpose. In the United Kingdom the Terrorist Act
requires that the terrorist oﬀence is committed with the pur-
pose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological
cause and that the perpetrator had either a ‘‘general’’ special
intent directed at causing a state of terror or a ‘‘special’’
39 Treaty on Cooperation Among the States Members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999, Art. 1.
40 The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998, Art. 1 (2): ‘‘Any
act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes […].’’
41 Annex to resolution no: 59/26-P, Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference on Combating International Terrorism, Art. 1 (2): ‘‘[…] with the aim of
terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour,
freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or
private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national
resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity,
political unity or sovereignty of independent States.’’
42 Conventionof theCooperationCouncil for theArabStatesof theGulfonCombating
Terrorism,Art. 1 (2): ‘‘[…] with the aimof terrorizingor harmingpeople or imperiling their
lives, freedom or security, or endangering the environment, any facility or any public or
private property or occupying or seizing them, or attacking a national resource.’’
43 For a comprehensive collection of national legislations see www.unodc.org/
tldb/browse_countries.html.
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special intent aimed at coercing a state to do or abstain from
any act.44 While the ‘‘general’’ special intent and ‘‘special’’
special intent only need to be fulﬁlled in the alternative, a
political, religious, racial or ideological purpose must always
exist (‘‘and’’). The terrorism deﬁnition of Australia45 and
New Zealand46 list similar requirements. In the Canadian
criminal code there is also the requirement of such a purpose
but it only needs to exist if the terrorist act is not covered by
any of the listed international conventions.47 On the other
hand, in the USA a political purpose is absent but a ‘‘general’’
and ‘‘special’’ special intent required; yet it is not necessary to
prove either of these intents for it is suﬃcient that the oﬀence
‘‘appears’’ to be intended to intimidate a population or
44 UK Terrorism Act of 2000, Art. 1 (1): ‘‘In this Act terrorism’ means the use or
threat of action where […] (b) the use or threat is designed to inﬂuence the gov-
ernment or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or
a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing
a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.’’ (emphasis added).
45 Australian Criminal Code, Part 5.3 division 100.1 I terrorist act: ‘‘(b) […] with
the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; and (c) the
action is done or the threat is made with the intention of: (i) coercing, or inﬂuencing
by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or
foreign country, or of part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or (ii) intimi-
dating the public or a section of the public.’’
46 New Zealand Terrorism Suppression Act, 2002, Art. 5 (2): ‘‘[…] for the purpose
of advancing an ideological, political, or religious cause, and with the following
intention: (a) to induce terror in a civilian population; or (b) to unduly compel or to
force a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any
act.’’
47 Art. 83.01 (1) Canadian Criminal Code: ‘‘terrorist activity’’ means (a) an act or
omission that is committed in or outside Canada and that, if committed in Canada, is
one of the following oﬀences: [oﬀences of international conventions] (b) an act or
omission, in or outside Canada, (i) that is committed (A) in whole or in part for a
political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and (B) in whole or in
part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with
regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a
government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from
doing any act.
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inﬂuence a government.48 In the Indian terrorist legislation
there is the requirement of a ‘‘general’’ special intent directed
to intimidate either the government or the people.49
17. With regard to major Civil Law countries it can be observed that
a ‘‘special’’ special intent is never, if at all, required exclusively as
far as the analyzed legislations are concerned. Some legislations
do not even provide for a speciﬁc terrorist oﬀence.50 In France
there is only the requirement of a ‘‘general’’ special intent
directed at disturbing the public order through intimidation
or terror.51 In Spain, a ‘‘special’’ special intent is required in
the alternative to a ‘‘general’’ special intent.52 The German,53
48 Section 2331 (1) (b) U.S. Code: ‘‘appear to be intended – (i) to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to inﬂuence the policy of a government by intimi-
dation or coercion; or (iii) to aﬀect the conduct of a government […].’’
49 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, Para. 3: ‘‘[…] with intent
to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or
any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely
aﬀect the harmony amongst diﬀerent sections of the people […].’’
50 This is, for example, the case of Brazil where the Constitution (Art. 4 VIII, 5
XLIII) condemns terrorism and declares any exemption from punishment inadmis-
sible but the criminal law only contains some selective references to the crime without
deﬁning it (see for example Art. 20 of the notorious Lei de Seguranc¸a Nacional, Lei
7.170 of 14 December 1983).
51 Articles 421-1 French Code Pe´nal: ‘‘[…] purpose of seriously disturbing the
public order through intimidation or terror […].’’
52 See with regard to the deﬁnition of terrorist groups, Art. 571 (3) Spanish
Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] tengan por ﬁnalidad o por objeto subvertir el orden constit-
ucional o alterar gravemente la paz pu´blica […]’’; identically with regard to indi-
viduals (Art. 577).
53 Section 129a German Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] intended to seriously intimidate the
population, to unlawfully coerce a public authority or an international organisation
through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, or to signiﬁcantly impair or
destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a
state or an international organization.’’ (Transl. by M. Bohlander, The German
Criminal Code: a modern English translation, Oxford: Hart, 2008).
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Italian,54 Austrian,55 Dutch56 and Danish57 terrorism deﬁnitions
follow basically the EU Framework Decision.58 The Finnish
Criminal Code is very unspeciﬁc as to the subjective require-
ments of terrorism since it only mentions a ‘‘terrorist intent’’.59
The Chilean terrorism deﬁnition requires a ‘‘special’’ special in-
tent60 and alternatively a ‘‘general’’ special intent.61 The same
applies to theArgentinean62 andMexican63 terrorism deﬁnitions.
Even though the Peruvian Law only requires a general intent,64
the jurisdiction has developed the requirement of a ‘‘special’’
54 Art. 270 sexies Italian Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] e sono compiute allo scopo di
intimidire la popolazione o costringere i poteri pubblici o un organizzazione in-
ternazionale a compiere o astenersi dal compiere un qualsiasi atto o destabilizzare o
distruggere le strutture politiche fondamentali, costituzionali, economiche e sociali di
un Paese o di un?organizzazione internazionale nonche´ le altre condotte […].’’
55 Section 278c Austrian Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] intended to seriously intimidate the
population, to unlawfully coerce a public authority or an international organisation
through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, or to signiﬁcantly impair or
destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a
state or an international organization.’’
56 Art. 83, 84 Dutch Criminal Code: ,,Onder terroristisch oogmerk wordt verstaan
het oogmerk om de bevolking of een deel der bevolking van een land ernstige vrees
aan te jagen, dan wel een overheid of internationale organisatie wederrechtelijk te
dwingen iets te doen, niet te doen of te dulden, dan wel de fundamentele politieke,
constitutionele, economische of sociale structuren van een land of een internationale
organisatie ernstig te ontwrichten of te vernietigen.‘‘
57 Section 114 Danish Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] with the intent to frighten a popula-
tion to a serious degree or to unlawfully coerce Danish or foreign public authorities
or an international organisation to carry out or omit to carry out an act or to
destabilize or destroy a country’s or an international organisation’s fundamental
political, constitutional, ﬁnancial or social structures […].’’
58 Cf. supra note 30.
59 Chap. 34a (1) Finnish Criminal Code: ‘‘A person who, with terrorist intent
[…].’’
60 Ley 18314 of 16 May 1984, Art. 1 (2a): ‘‘Que el delito sea cometido para
arrancar resoluciones de la autoridad o imponerle exigencias.’’
61 Ibid. Art. 1 (1a): ‘‘[…] ﬁnalidad de producir en la poblacio´n o en una parte de
ella […] temor […].’’
62 Art. 213 ter Argentinean Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] asociacio´n ilı´cita cuyo propo´sito
sea […] aterrorizar a la poblacio´n u obligar a un gobierno o a una organizacio´n
internacional a realizar un acto o abstenerse de hacerlo […].’’
63 Art. 139 Mexican Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] o presionar a la autoridad para. que
tome una determinacio´n […].’’
64 Art. 2 Decreto Ley No. 25475 of 5 Aug. 1992.
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special intent.65 In Colombia a ‘‘special’’ special intent is not
required as part of the basic oﬀence (tipo ba´sico) but is consid-
ered an aggravating circumstance.66 In the Chinese criminal code
there is no deﬁnition of terrorism but only an enumeration of
terrorist acts. These oﬀences must generally be committed
intentionally but for some oﬀences even negligence is suﬃcient.67
In theRussian criminal code terrorism requires either a ‘‘general’’
special intent directed at frightening the population or a ‘‘special’’
special intent aimed at inﬂuencing the government.68
3.3 Further Sources
18. A further ‘‘special’’ special intent in the form of a polit-
ical purpose requirement exists also in one UN General
Assembly resolution.69 Yet, GA Resolutions are not bind-
ing (cf. Art. 13 (1) UN-Charter) and create ‘‘soft law’’ at best.70
3.4 Intermediate Conclusion
19. A ‘‘special’’ special intent is provided for by 2 of the 13 UN
Terrorism Conventions. On the regional level, the deﬁnition of
the EU’s Framework Decision, which is binding for all member
states of the European Union,71 requires two forms of a ‘‘spe-
cial’’ special intent, but only in the alternative to a ‘‘general’’
special intent. All other regional conventions, if they require a
65 Cf. for example Polay Campos case, Sala Penal Nacional, Judg. 21 March 2006,
p. 130: ‘‘El terrorismo tiene como ﬁnalidad subvertir el orden constitucional y el
orden polı´tico en su sentido amplio […]’’; similarly Abimael Guzman case, Sala
Penal Nacional, Judg. 13 October 2006, p. 145 (‘‘ﬁnalidad polı´tica’’).
66 Art. 344 no. 3 Colombian Penal Code: ‘‘La conducta se ejecute para impedir o
alterar el normal desarrollo de certa´menes democra´ticos.’’
67 Cf. Art. 114 et seq. Chinese Criminal Code.
68 Art. 205 Russian Criminal Code: ‘‘[…] for the purpose of violating public
security, frightening the population, or exerting inﬂuence on decision-making by
governmental bodies […].’’
69 UN GA Resolution 49/69, A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994, Annex I para. 3:
‘‘Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes […].’’
70 Cf. Pellet, in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court
of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Art. 38 ICJ Statute, para. 103; A.
Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 335.
71 Cf. Already supra note 29.
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‘‘special’’ special intent at all (the OAU convention coming most
closely to the EU framework decision), do so in the alternative.
In a similar vein, national laws usually require a ‘‘special’’ special
intent only in alternative to a ‘‘general’’ special intent. Only some
Common Law countries require a further ‘‘special’’ special intent
in the form of a political purpose requirement. This requirement
is also contained in a UN GA resolution.
IV DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDE FOR A SPECIAL
MOTIVE AS AN (ADDITIONAL) ELEMENT OF THE
TERRORISM OFFENCE?
20. Apart from the political purpose requirement which belongs to
the intent and was therefore dealt with above, the relevant
sources do not provide for subjective elements which explicitly
require or imply particular motives. On the contrary, interna-
tional law quite unequivocally rejects any relevance of motives
with regard to the crime of terrorism.
21. None of the 13 international conventions contains any statement
about the requirement of a political or ideological motive or moti-
vation. Quite to the contrary, in the Terrorist Bombing, Terrorist
Financing and Nuclear Terrorism Conventions it is unequivocally
held that, for the purpose of extradition and legal assistance, none of
the oﬀences shall be regarded as a political oﬀence.72
22. Resolution 1566 of the UN Security Council makes clear that all
acts of terrorism are condemned irrespective of their motiva-
tion.73 In Resolutions 1617, 1735, 1805, 1822 and 1904 the
Security Council reaﬃrmed this notion of terrorism by holding
that ‘‘any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustiﬁable
regardless of their motivations’’.74
23. Equally, the speciﬁc OAS Terrorism Convention states that
‘‘[terrorist acts] shall be considered common crimes of interna-
tional signiﬁcance, regardless of motive’’.75 In the Arab Con-
72 Terrorist Financing Convention, Art. 11; Terrorist Financing Convention, Art.
14; Nuclear Terrorism Convention, Art. 15.
73 UN SC Resolution 1566, S/RES/1566, 8 October 2004, para. 1.
74 UN SC Resolution 1617, S/RES/1617, 29 July 2005, introductory part para. 2;
1735, S/Res/1735, 22Dec. 2006, introductory part para. 2; 1805, S/Res/1805, 20March
2008, introductory part para. 1; 1822, S/Res/1822, 17 June 2008, introductory part
para. 2; 1904, S/RES/1904, 17 Dec. 2009, introductory part para. 2 (emphasis added).
75 OAS Terrorism Convention, supra note 33 (emphasis added).
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 405
vention on the Suppression of Terrorism, terrorism is deﬁned as
‘‘any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or pur-
poses’’.76 In the OAU’s Terrorism Convention it is even held
– in stark contrast to the second qualiﬁer mentioned above
(para. 5) – that ‘‘Political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justiﬁable defence
against a terrorist act.’’77
24. The same strict position is taken by the GA Resolution 49/60
concerning measures to eliminate international terrorism, where
it is expressed that terrorist acts ‘‘are in any circumstance
unjustiﬁable, whatever the considerations of a political, philo-
sophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature
that may be invoked to justify them’’.78
25. Thus, it is fair to say that the relevant international instruments
reject any ‘‘politicisation’’ of the terrorism oﬀence by the
inclusion of political, ideological or religious motives or by
taking such motives into account in qualifying terrorist conduct.
V CONCLUSION
26. With regard to a ‘‘special’’ special intent requirement the rele-
vant sources of international law reveal the following: While
such a requirement is provided for in several (regional) con-
ventions and instruments, it never exists in an exclusive but only
in an alternative form to the general special intent requirements.
The same applies to those national jurisdictions which require a
‘‘special’’ special intent at all. Thus, while one may consider that
the widespread recourse to a ‘‘special’’ special intent element in
major national jurisdictions (taking the EU framework decision
as the binding position of the 27 EUmember states) would make
this element a general principle of law within the meaning of Art.
38 (1)(c) ICJ Statute, it would at best allow for the recognition of
a ‘‘special’’ special intent as an alternative special intent element.
27. As already made clear at the beginning of this analysis (para. 3),
Art. 314 LCC can only be construed in favour of the accused.
76 Arab Terrorism Convention, supra note 40 (emphasis added).
77 OAU Terrorism Convention, supra note 34 (emphasis added).
78 UN GA Resolution, supra note 69.
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While the requirement of an additional ‘‘special’’ special intent
would, in principle, restrict the scope of Art. 314 LCC, this is
not the case if it were only included, as suggested by interna-
tional law, in the alternative to the – already existing – ‘‘general’’
special intent. In other words, an alternative special intent
requirement, derived from international law, would broaden the
scope of Art. 314 LCC since perpetrators with either of the two
special intents would qualify as terrorists; only a cumulative
inclusion of the two special intents would narrow the scope of
Art. 314 LCC.
28. As far as the political purpose requirement – as a kind of further
‘‘special’’ special intent – is concerned, it would certainly restrict
the scope of Art. 314 LCC given that it is required cumulatively
to a special intent. Yet, the relevant sources indicate that it
exists to only such a limited degree that it cannot even be
considered a general principle of law.
29. The relevant international law is even clearer with regard to the
requirement of a special motive. Such a requirement is not only
absent in the relevant sources but it is outrightly rejected by
most of them. Apart from that, even if it existed it would not be
relevant at the level of the objective elements of the oﬀence
(irrelevance thesis, para. 4).
30. It can thus be concluded that there exists no cogent rule in
international law which would allow for a bonam partem
interpretation or restriction of Art. 314 LCC. On the contrary,
the alternative approach taken by international law would entail
a broadening of the scope of this provision. To be sure, there are
good reasons to argue for a restrictive interpretation of the
oﬀence of terrorism, for example by adding a ‘‘special’’ special
intent element (in addition to any other subjective element).79
79 The scholarly debate has for a long time been critical of the overcriminalization
generated by the anti-terrorism legislation and policy, see instead of many Manuel
Cancio Melia´, Terrorism and Criminal Law: the Dream of Prevention, the Night-
mare of the Rule of Law’ (2011) 14 New Criminal Law Review, pp. 108–122, at 110:
‘‘from my point of view – and this is the common opinion of criminal theorists
trained in the civil law tradition – the criminal law’s current response to terrorism in
the Western world is grossly disproportional to the kind of harm that is threatened
by terrorist oﬀenses, even if one takes into account the diﬀerences between terrorist
crimes and common oﬀenses. Furthermore, I believe that the criminal law’s actual
response to terrorism is riddled with unconstitutional laws that impose cruel and
unusual punishments, unjustiﬁably criminalize acts that do not clearly inﬂict cog-
nizable harm, and signiﬁcantly and inexcusably limit the due process rights of
defendants charged with crimes of terrorism.’’
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Yet, again, this approach is not inevitably called for by
international law but ultimately the national legislator’s
decision.
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